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Jane Austen holds a distinguished role in modern society as a heritage author, 
whose novels depict proper ladies with excellent manners. While critics have 
often characterized Austen’s works as conservative, others have more recently 
established the connection between Austen’s novels, specifically her first 
published work Sense and Sensibility (1811), and Mary Wollstonecraft’s radical 
treatise, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). However, previous 
analyses have failed to place reason and sensibility at the center of 
Wollstonecraft’s influence on Austen’s writing. In this essay, I argue that Sense 
and Sensibility builds on Wollstonecraft’s criticism of women’s under-education, 
which informs and guides her radical critique of sensibility. A close examination 
of Wollstonecraft helps the reader to see that both Wollstonecraft and Austen 
contend that reason and sensibility are essential in constituting women’s agency 
and distinguishing themselves as virtuous individuals.  
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Jane Austen holds a distinguished role in modern society as a heritage author 
whose novels depict proper ladies with excellent manners. In her first published 
novel, Sense and Sensibility (1811), Austen positions two female heroines, the 
Dashwood sisters, at the center of her narrative. Elinor Dashwood is a nineteen-
year-old woman characterized by her extremely good manners, who serves as a 
model for her younger sister Marianne Dashwood, a seventeen-year-old girl 
overrun by her subscription to the cult of sensibility. Marianne matures over the 
course of her narrative, becoming ‘sensible’ like her sister, and ultimately marries 
a man who by no means conforms to her former ideal of a romantic hero. Sense 
and Sensibility is oftentimes described as Austen’s most conservative work 
because it is interpreted as ‘disciplining’ Marianne Dashwood—teaching her to 
conform to society’s values and propriety, and to give up her own sensibility. 
The charge of conservatism was forwarded prominently by Marilyn Butler 
in her 1975 book, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas. Butler argues, “The crucial 
actions of her [Austen’s] novels is in itself expressive of the conservative side of 
an active war of ideas” (Butler 294). This “war of ideas” is the eighteenth century 
ideological clash between the Jacobins and Anti-Jacobins in Great Britain. 
Jacobin novels were written by eighteenth century British radicals who supported 
the ideals of the French revolution, especially its individualism. In reaction to the 
Jacobins, the Anti-Jacobin novelists created satires of Jacobin novels and asserted 
the power of community over the individual. Butler contends that Austen is the 
same kind of Anti-Jacobin, participating in conservative satire against sensibility. 
Jane Austen’s works belong to “a movement of that defines itself in opposition to 
revolution,” which maintains conservative ideals (Butler 123).1 
Few critics have challenged Butler’s characterization, with the notable 
exceptions of Claudia L. Johnson, Margaret Kirkham, and, more recently, Peter 
Knox-Shaw and Hina Nazar. Knox-Shaw and Nazar, in response to Butler’s 
assertion that Austen is an Anti-Jacobin committed conservative, argue that the 
politics of the novel are instead derived from Enlightenment ideals (Knox-Shaw 
5). Kirkham and Johnson further distinguish Austen apart from conservative 
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ideologies, drawing important comparisons between Austen and radical women 
authors of the 1790s. Johnson argues, “Progressive women novelists urge a 
rationality, usefulness, and fortitude…For them, cultural injunctions about female 
manners are subjected to radical social criticism. They attack education practices 
promoting women’s self-immolating enslavement to their own passions” (Johnson 
67-68). Kirkham draws a specific comparison between the works of Austen and 
Mary Wollstonecraft, arguing that “Austen’s…viewpoint on the moral nature and 
status of women, female education, marriage, authority and the family, and the 
representation of women in literature is strikingly similar to that shown by Mary 
Wollstonecraft in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman” (Kirkham xi). These 
rebuttals of Butler’s depiction of Austen’s conservatism identify crucial gaps in 
Butler’s argument. However, these analyses fail to place reason and sensibility at 
the center of Wollstonecraft’s influence on Austen’s writing. The common 
opposition of “reason” and “sensibility” in Wollstonecraft and “sense” and 
“sensibility” in Austen is representative of the chief way in which the radical 
Wollstonecraft influenced Austen.  
 When Austen’s work is considered in the context of Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s pioneering feminist treatise A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (1792), her critique of sensibility does not seem conservative. In this 
essay, I argue that Sense and Sensibility builds on Wollstonecraft’s criticism of 
female education, which informs and guides her radical critique of sensibility. 
The feminine experiences documented in Austen’s novels of social pursuits and 
marriages closely resemble the educational experiences of socialization that 
Wollstonecraft describes. Wollstonecraft and Austen craft critiques of sensibility 
in which female education is scrutinized and found to foster sensibility in women 
without cultivating their sense or reason. Neither Wollstonecraft nor Austen 
suggest that sensibility is valueless in their extreme assessments. Both see the 
cooperation of head and heart as crucial to female agency and argue that it is 
important for women to promote a personal balance of reason and sensibility, not 
just attending to one or the other as the more essential faculty. The writings of 
these authors provide not a vindication of reason over sensibility, but a 
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vindication of reason and then sensibility. A close examination of Wollstonecraft 
helps the reader to see that both Wollstonecraft and Austen contend that reason 
and sensibility are essential in constituting women’s agency and distinguishing 
themselves as virtuous individuals.  
 
Wollstonecraft’s Critique in Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
Wollstonecraft criticizes the eighteenth century main model of education that 
women receive which only cultivates their sensibilities without attending to 
reason. Women, she argues, have been deprived of the right to be virtuous people 
by being educated to foster only their emotions. Enlightenment men are expected 
to pursue higher forms of education and develop their reason, which they then use 
to write, vote, hold office, and participate in the public sphere. However, women 
are not legally able to participate in those social roles and thus are not educated to 
attain the same level of reason (Wollstonecraft).  
Wollstonecraft finds females to be the same as males “in all the most 
important aspects…possessing the same souls, the same mental capacities, and 
thus the same human rights” (Mellor 141). These rights make it “morally 
requisite” that women’s education undergoes reforms and that women are allowed 
to pursue greater intellectual enrichment (Nazar 83). As Barbara Taylor observes, 
Wollstonecraft’s program of education asks women to “abandon false femininity 
for the ‘practical virtues’ of rationality, independence, self-reliance” (Taylor 141). 
This, Wollstonecraft argues, can only be successfully achieved through the 
exercise of reason in balance with sensibility.  
Wollstonecraft defines sensibility as “quickness of sensation; quickness of 
perception; delicacy,” and an “exquisitely polished instinct” (Wollstonecraft 133). 
2 Wollstonecraft disputes female education that encourages women to become 
fine ladies, to read nothing serious, and to spend time only contemplating how to 
secure a husband. This education develops only sensibility and leaves no room for 
reason. When overcome by sensibility, women become “prey to their senses…and 
are blown about by every momentary gust of feeling” (VRW 130). In this way, 
women are bound to act on their “faculties of perception or sensation” instead of 
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their faculties of reason and intellect (“sense, n”). When women are thus affected 
by sensibility, “their understandings are neglected” and women are unable to 
cultivate their faculties and form reasonable thoughts (VRW 130). Reason is set 
against sensibility in Wollstonecraft’s treatise as, “the simple power of 
improvement; or, more properly speaking, of discerning truth” (VRW 122). 
Wollstonecraft indicates the importance of reason as it relates to virtue and 
independence. She argues that reason is essential to virtue and autonomy because 
both require careful meditation on one’s actions and motives. Strength of mind is 
measured by “the degree to which it [the mind] can independently reach its own 
conclusions through the force of thinking and observation” (Sapiro 55). 
Wollstonecraft contends, “Virtue can be built on no other foundation” than 
“female understanding” (VRW 124).  
The overemphasis on sensibility is used to perpetuate a system of 
subordination, one that keeps women in a persistent “state of childhood” and 
prevents them from social advancement or attainment of the same virtues as men 
(VRW 131). Wollstonecraft says, “This overstretched sensibility naturally relaxes 
the other powers of the mind, and prevents intellect from attaining that 
sovereignty which it ought to attain to render a rational creature useful to others” 
(VRW 131). In the current social and political system governed by Enlightenment 
ideals, only “negative virtues” are expected from women (if any at all), namely 
“patience, docility good-humour, and flexibility” (VRW 138). Wollstonecraft 
claims that these types of virtues are “incompatible with any exertion or intellect” 
and prevent women from reaching their true potential as rational, moral human 
beings. Wollstonecraft contends that, “if woman be allowed to have an immortal 
soul, she must have, as employment of life, an understanding to improve” (VRW 
133).  
According to Wollstonecraft, not only does an education in sensibility 
alone reinforce women’s dependence on men but it also, potentially, damages 
their psychic and physical health. Sensibility makes women victims of themselves 
if they lose self-control and it makes them victims of men as well. She argues 
that: 
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Civilized women are, therefore, so weakened by false 
refinement…Ever restless and anxious, their over exercised 
sensibility not only renders them uncomfortable themselves, but 
troublesome…to others. All their thoughts turn on things 
calculated to excite emotion; and feeling, when they should reason, 
their conduct is unstable, and their opinions are wavering…A 
distinction should be made between inflaming and strengthening 
them [passions]. The passions thus pampered, whilst the judgment 
is left unformed, what can be expected to ensue? —Undoubtedly, a 
mixture of madness and folly! (VRW 131) 
 
Overindulgence of sensibility weakens women, making them victims to 
themselves and to men, as it only provides them with the superficial means of 
exciting emotion and feeling. Wollstonecraft’s efforts to overturn this idea would 
provide women with greater personal autonomy and allow them to become more 
rational, independent beings. This cult of sensibility, the eighteenth century social 
conventions which promote exaggerated expressions of emotion, “inflames” the 
senses, and the “madness and folly” that women exhibit makes them victims to 
their “passions,” emotions, and senses. Additionally, men have used this argument 
of madness to continually subjugate women. Wollstonecraft observes that, “Men 
complain, and with reason, of the follies and caprices of our sex, when they do not 
keenly satirize our headstrong passions and groveling vice” (VRW 84). 
Wollstonecraft argues that the victimization of women can be avoided, however, 
by “strengthening” the passions through the cultivation of judgment in 
conjunction with sensibility. 
While Wollstonecraft’s critique of sensibility is thoroughgoing, it does not 
imply that sensibility has no value in women’s lives. She is critical of the ways in 
which education promotes sensibility in women, but does not disavow the 
importance of both reason and sensibility to female virtue and agency. She does 
not call for women to abandon all traces of sensibility, but to use their 
understanding to protect against flighty and thoughtless emotions. Indeed, for 
Wollstonecraft, the strongest passions require a blending of sense and sensibility. 
As she puts it, “it is not against strong, persevering passions; but romantic 
wavering feelings that I wish to guard the female heart by exercising the 
understanding” (VRW 146). The use of reason can strengthen and give force to the 
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affections: “the heart, as well as the understanding, is opened by cultivation” 
(VRW 136). Catriona Mackenzie argues for a similar claim, noting that for 
Wollstonecraft, “in a well-balanced, virtuous character, reason and sensibility 
should mutually strengthen and support each other rather than either dominating 
the other” (Mackenzie 44).  
Wollstonecraft’s argument that both reason and sensibility are important 
to female virtue is developed through her discussion of the two most significant 
feminine vocations of eighteenth-century, middle-class women: marriage and 
motherhood. Wollstonecraft criticizes men who have considered women to be 
something “other than human creatures” and chosen to make them “alluring 
mistresses [rather] than affectionate wives and rational mothers” (VRW 71). 
Virginia Sapiro argues that Wollstonecraft “worried that in a world not governed 
by reason most parents were not equipped to teach their children reason, therefore 
good habits of mind” (Sapiro 67). The importance assigned to reason in the 
feminine roles of “affectionate wife” and “rational mother” cannot be fully 
realized until women are given the opportunity to enhance their faculties. 
Wollstonecraft argues that, “in the regulation of a family, in the education of 
children, understanding…is particularly required: strength both of body and 
mind” (VRW 134). Additionally, she contends that that if a woman is not 
“prepared by education to become the companion of man, she will stop the 
progress of knowledge and virtue” (VRW 66). This ascribes crucial influence to 
women in the management of a family and upbringing of children, and 
Wollstonecraft notes that those women “whose minds are not enlarged by 
cultivation, or the natural selfishness of sensibility expanded by reflection, are 
very unfit to manage a family” (VRW 137). Both reason and sensibility are 
requisite female attributes in women’s social roles as wives and mothers. 
The reflections that Wollstonecraft provides on marriage also 
communicate the importance of both reason and sensibility in the lives of women. 
This balance of faculties is crucial for women to have a happy marriage. 
Wollstonecraft claims that a successful and fulfilling marriage is not based simply 
on love or lust, but on companionship. She says, “Friendship or indifference 
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inevitably succeeds love” (VRW 96). She contends that if women are unable to 
use their powers of reason in marriage, they are unable to build a strong 
foundation of friendship upon which a lasting marriage can be established. She 
indicates that, “the woman who strengthens her body and exercises her mind 
will…become the friend, and not the humble dependent of her husband” (VRW 
95). Lust and passion will fade, and when it does only those couples that have 
developed a warm and deep friendship first will enjoy the greater pleasures of 
marriage. Wollstonecraft maintains that, “When the husband ceases to be a 
lover—and the time will inevitably come, her desire of pleasing will then grow 
languid, or become a spring of bitterness; and love, perhaps, the most evanescent 
of all passions, gives place to jealousy or vanity” (VRW 93). The cult of 
sensibility, which female education encouraged women to promote, creates 
marriages based on lust, love, and fondness, which are “poor substitutes for 
friendship” (VRW 95). Wollstonecraft’s affirmation of the happy marriage 
confirms that both reason and sensibility have an essential role if one hopes to 
maintain a supportive union based on not just lust and passions alone, but on 
sincere love and friendship as well.  
While Wollstonecraft foregrounds women’s traditional roles as wives and 
mothers, she is also interested in women’s ability to be self-governing agents. 
This, too, requires a combination of sense and sensibility. Wollstonecraft 
contends that she “does not wish them [women] to have power over men; but over 
themselves” (VRW 133). Furthermore, she argues that women cannot obtain virtue 
until “they are, in some degree, independent of men” (VRW 221). This divergent 
view distinguishes Wollstonecraft as a radical writer of her time. She concedes 
that “reason is the proper work of the head, sensibility is the proper work of the 
heart” and women need a balance of both qualities to become well-rounded, 
virtuous individuals (Sapiro 65). She argues that, “the most perfect education…is 
such an exercise of the understanding as it is best calculated to strengthen the 
body and form the heart” (VRW 86). The ladylike Austen, whose novels often 
feature female heroines who focus solely on marriage and propriety, in reality 
crafts complex characters who reveal that she shares Wollstonecraft’s beliefs. 
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Both Wollstonecraft and Austen believe that women reach their highest potential 
when they are allowed to become rational individuals, strengthening both their 
head and heart. Women need both of these qualities, reason and sensibility, to 
acquire virtue and achieve their highest potential.  
 
Austen’s Critique in Sense and Sensibility 
Austen and Wollstonecraft bear many similarities when closely examined. 
Wollstonecraft’s “affectionate wife” and “rational mother,” closely parallels 
Marianne Dashwood’s final position as a woman with a “new attachment, 
entering on new duties, placed in a new home, a wife, the mistress of a family, 
and the patroness of a village.” (SS 288). Instead of continuing to act on the 
whims of her emotions and sensibility, “instead of falling sacrifice to an 
irresistible passions,” she learns to relieve the tension between her sense and 
sensibility (SS 288). Like Wollstonecraft advocates in Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, Marianne does not abandon all sensibility, but moderates it in 
conjunction with rational thought to become a virtuous woman, wife, and 
eventual mother. Wollstonecraft and Austen demonstrate through different means 
not the value of one attribute over the other, but the importance of developing 
both reason and sensibility in moderation to assert female agency and realize 
personal autonomy previously unavailable to women. If women are proven to be 
just as mentally capable as men, and equally esteemed in the eyes of God as 
human beings, then it is morally requisite that they be educated and able to attain 
both reason and sensibility to become virtuous human beings. 
Like Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Austen’s 
novels are centrally concerned with education in the broad sense of upbringing 
and socialization. They often portray bildungsroman, a process of growing up or 
gaining greater emotional and moral maturity in a young female protagonist of 
marriageable age. Of all of Austen’s novels, however, Sense and Sensibility 
reflects Wollstonecraft’s first published work most closely through its central 
themes of reason (or sense) and sensibility. Originally drafted as an epistolary 
novel titled Elinor and Marianne, Austen wrote Sense and Sensibility in the midst 
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of the revolutionary controversy of the 1790s, when many British conservatives 
mocked the radicals’ interest in sensibility. However, the association of radicalism 
and a belief in sensibility established by Marilyn Butler is inaccurate. Radicals did 
not value only sensibility; in fact, most, like Wollstonecraft, argued for the 
importance of rational agency.  
When introducing Marianne, the Austen’s narrator says, “She was sensible 
and clever; but eager in every thing; her sorrows, her joys, could have no 
moderation. She was…every thing but prudent” (Austen 6). 3 This would initially 
lead the reader to believe that Marianne is the antithesis of her sister Elinor, and 
represents only sensibility in the novel. Although in continuing her 
characterization of Marianne, Austen goes on to counteract that assumption, as 
the narrator states that, “Marianne’s abilities were, in many respects, quite equal 
to Elinor’s” (SS 6). Johnson claims, “A close examination of Elinor and Marianne 
does not permit us to conclude that they represent antithetical modes of 
behavior…But the differences between them are nevertheless significant” 
(Johnson 64). Austen asserts that Marianne has both reason and sensibility, but 
suggests that she cultivates one at the expense of the other.  
Marianne’s initial encounters with Willoughby are indicative of the 
problems with her sensibility. When she first meets him, she immediately falls in 
love without even knowing him. While Marianne is walking through the country 
she trips and falls, and is then literally swept off her feet and carried away by a 
handsome, mysterious stranger—Willoughby. Marianne is led by her sensibility, 
unchecked by reason, to believe in love at first sight, and this unfounded 
attachment, which she makes so suddenly, continues to plague her throughout the 
novel. When recounting the incident that creates the circumstance for Marianne  
and Willoughby’s meeting, the narrator says: 
 
His manly beauty and more than common gracefulness were 
instantly the themes of general admiration, and…his gallantry 
raised against Marianne…Marianne herself had seen less of his 
person than the rest…But she had seen enough of him to join in the 
admiration of all the others, and with an energy which always 
adorned her praise. His person and air were equal to what her 
fancy had ever drawn for the hero of a favourite story. (SS 33) 
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The narrator accounts for the “gallantry” of Willoughby’s actions in this moment, 
and how it aligns with Marianne’s ideas of a romantic, heroic figure. Her deficient 
powers of reason do not lead her to question these feelings and assumptions, even 
though she has seen less of him than anyone else. Her love is fueled by “energy,” 
not true acquaintance or rational thought. This immediate and unsubstantiated 
attachment that she forms to Willoughby so early on only causes her pain as the 
narrative continues.  
Marianne and Willoughby later find time to converse in more detail, when 
they meet at dinner at Barton Park. Marianne is so consumed and enthralled by 
her sensibilities in this moment, however, that she is unable to identify their 
incompatible traits. When speaking with Willoughby, she finds that their tastes in 
music, dance, and books are “strikingly alike,” however the narrator notes that 
Willoughby “acquiesced in all her decisions, caught all her enthusiasm” (SS 36). 
Marianne is so affected by her sensibilities and baseless love for Willoughby that 
she does not bother to question Willoughby’s answers. Instead of realizing that he 
is simply agreeing with her to please her, Marianne is too easily carried away and 
led to believe that the two are such a well-matched pair that after one conversation 
they are as familiar with each other as one is with a “long-established 
acquaintance” (SS 36).  
Marianne becomes a victim of herself by cause of the intense emotions, 
love, and attachment she feels and internalizes towards Willoughby. Marianne’s 
senses are so entirely inflamed that these feelings consume her entirely and make 
her incapable of any other employment. When waiting in London, Marianne is 
anxious to see Willoughby and cannot sit still because her senses become aroused 
and demand her full attention. Marianne’s “spirits still continued very high, but 
there was a flutter in them…and this agitation increased as the evening drew on. 
She could scarcely eat any dinner, and when they afterwards returned to the 
drawing room, seemed anxiously listening to the sound of every carriage” (SS 
120). Marianne is so absorbed by her senses that she abandons rational behavior 
and neglects all other events happening around her.  
Re:Search 
Volume 3, Issue 1 | 2016 12 
Similarly, Marianne becomes a victim to sensibility when Willoughby 
suddenly leaves Barton Park for London and the physical reactions to her 
overwhelming sadness prevent her from doing anything productive. After the loss 
of Willoughby, Marianne “was awake the whole night, and she wept the greatest 
part of it. She got up with a headache, was unable to talk, and unwilling to take 
any nourishment; giving pain every moment to her mother and sisters, and 
forbidding all attempt at consolation from either. Her sensibility was potent 
enough!” (SS 63). Marianne makes herself victim to her sensibilities and is 
thoughtless about the pain she is inflicting on others as she becomes physically ill 
from the overindulgence of her passions. Marianne makes herself sick once again 
in Cleveland after returning from London with a “heart swelling with emotion” 
(SS 228). Completely preoccupied by her “invaluable misery” and “tears of 
agony,” she “resolves to spend almost every hour of every day…in the indulgence 
of such solitary rambles” (SS 229). However, her solitary walks reveal her 
thoughtless actions informed by passion instead of reason, which make her ill 
once again. After walking through long, wet grasses on the grounds, with the 
“great imprudence of sitting in her wet shoes and stockings,” Marianne catches “a 
cold so violent” that it “forced itself by increasing ailments, on the concern of 
every body, and the notice of herself” (SS 231). This severe illness, caused by 
neglect and indulgence of her misery and sorrow, is representative of the “mixture 
of madness and folly” that ensues when women’s “passions are thus pampered, 
whilst the judgment is left unformed” (VRW 131). Austen’s narrator in Sense and 
Sensibility loves Marianne in some ways, but does not refrain from highlighting 
her subscription to the fad of cultivating sensibility. 
Marianne learns to utilize a combination of sense and sensibility by the 
end of the novel, developing both capabilities as a result of her experiences and 
the reformed education she receives. She does begin the narrative possessing both 
sense and sensibility, but she subscribes to the trend of cultivating sensibility 
alone. She is misled into thinking that sensibility alone constitutes agency because 
it resists conformity to societally accepted ideas about propriety. Marianne begins 
the novel as an unreasonable and distraught individual. In one of her most 
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illuminating emotional outbursts, she laments to Elinor after being chastised for 
her dramatic response to Willoughby’s rejection. Marianne responds to Elinor 
saying, “I cannot, I cannot…leave me, leave me, if I distress you; leave me, hate 
me, forget me! but do not torture me so. Oh! how easy for those who have no 
sorrow of their own to talk of exertion! Happy, happy Elinor, you cannot have an 
idea of what I suffer” (SS 138). This outburst is again representative of the 
dangers of sensibility that Wollstonecraft warns against.  
Austen argues that this overindulgence results not from a natural feminine 
characteristic, but from misinformation and faulty education. When Marianne 
experiences an outburst and cannot remain composed, it is not only because it is 
not “beyond the reach of Marianne,” but mostly because, “it was beyond her 
wish” (SS 131). The narrator admits early on that, “She was without any desire of 
command over herself” (SS 63). What occurs over the course of the novel, then, is 
not an abandonment of sensibility, but an education reform that convinces 
Marianne that the link between reason and propriety is not contradictory. As 
Marianne and Willoughby continue to become acquainted, Marianne makes her 
affections for him openly clear. Elinor suggests to Marianne that she should be 
more discreet about her feelings, as they are not wholly proper for a woman who 
has only just met a man (and is not yet engaged to him). Elinor insists that “the 
pleasantness of an employment does not always evince its propriety,” and that an 
open show of such affections will only expose Marianne to “some very 
impertinent remarks” (SS 52). The narrator explains Marianne’s motives for this  
refusal to conceal her sentiments, saying: 
 
[Elinor] did venture to suggest the propriety of some self-
command to Marianne. But Marianne abhorred all concealment 
where no real disgrace could attend unreserved; and to aim at the 
restraint of sentiments which were not in themselves illaudable, 
appeared to her not merely an unnecessary effort, but a disgraceful 
subjection of reason to commonplace and mistaken notions. (SS 
41)  
 
Marianne does not employ restraint because she is unable to do so, or has been 
instructed otherwise, but rather feels that the “restraint of sentiments” is akin to 
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enforced control and “subjection of reason.” This type of restraint submits to an 
ideology based on societal ideas of propriety that she finds to be unfounded and 
she is unwilling to submit to them. Johnson argues that, “Marianne advocates self-
expression unhampered by conventional restraints…Far from basing her actions 
on impulsive, purely subjective feelings, Marianne employs a rational argument to 
justify her behavior, one that illuminates the essential arbitrariness of established 
standards” (Johnson 60). 
Susan Morgan also identifies this initial misconception in Marianne’s 
logic. She argues, “Not only does Marianne want to trust feelings as the guides to 
truth and goodness, she does this by collapsing the distinction between feeling 
and expression, thus making expression spontaneous and inevitable. The world 
becomes a simpler place if there is a direct correspondence between our emotions 
and their expressions in words and actions” (Morgan 120-121). Marianne’s 
refusal to submit to established codes of convention of propriety is an attempt to 
maintain the simplicity of a life in which one can say and so precisely what they 
feel without repercussions. The contrast between Marianne’s obvious outbursts 
and her more subtle hints at the convictions that drive them emphasizes the 
complexity of her character and prevents the reader from completely discrediting 
her as a woman overrun by sensibility and in need of reform. Marianne 
acknowledges her transformation near the end of the novel, as she joins her older 
sister Elinor as a female embodiment of both sense and sensibility in cooperation. 
She says, “I have not a doubt of it…and I have nothing to regret—nothing but my 
own folly” (SS 267). Marianne is represented not as a frivolous lady ruled by 
emotion, but as an intelligent young woman whose intelligence is obscured by her 
subscription to the fad of sensibility. 
Marianne’s transformation at the end of the novel proves troubling for 
some critics. Butler and others take Marianne’s “extraordinary fate” as a clear 
example of Austen’s committed conservatism. The narrator says, “She [Marianne] 
was born to discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her 
conduct, her most favourite maxims” (SS 288). Critics see Marianne’s fate as a 
rebirth into a new self, after her sensibilities and subsequent illnesses almost kill 
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her. However, I argue that Marianne is not reborn into sense alone, but into both 
sense and sensibility. She does not completely abandon her former self, but brings 
a piece of her sensational tendencies into her new roles as a wife and future 
mother. Even though Austen concludes Marianne’s education somewhat abruptly, 
with a reformed Marianne who vows that her “feelings shall be governed 
and…temper improved,” the reader is left not with a heroine who has grown out 
of sensibility into sense, but who has instead learned to combine and utilize both 
in cooperation (SS 263).  
In spite of Marianne’s role as a warning against the dangers of cultivating 
sensibility alone, Austen is not opposing Elinor’s sense to Marianne’s sensibility. 
Elinor possesses both sense and sensibility herself, and in combining both 
qualities she is a representative figure of the type of female education that 
Wollstonecraft advocates. Knox-Shaw, who provides a rebuttal of Butler’s 
preeminent assertion that Austen is a political conservative, identifies the ways in 
which Elinor and Marianne combine the traits of reason and sensibility instead of  
possessing one or the other in isolation. He observes,  
 
“We hear almost as much of Elinor’s self-command as we do of 
Marianne’s sensibility. But the plot works in such a way as to 
complicate and test these attributes. Each sister is…both an agent 
and a spectator of the other, and for each of them, the special 
endowment is complemented by its contrary, so that Marianne is 
‘sensible’ as well as amiable, and Elinor has ‘good heart’ in 
addition to her sense” (Knox-Shaw 146). 
 
Both characters work to balance both traits, which reveals that strength of head 
and heart are equally important to Austen (and Wollstonecraft). The narrator 
indicates at the start of the novel that, “Elinor…possessed a strength of 
understanding, and coolness of judgment” (SS 5-6). However, she also “had an 
excellent heart; —her disposition was affectionate, and her feelings were strong; 
but she knew how to govern them” (SS 6). Austen begins by avoiding a strict 
alignment of Elinor with sense, also commenting on the strengths of her 
“affections” and “feelings” which are often properly governed. It is clear that 
Elinor does feel and is affected by her own sensibilities just as Marianne is, but 
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her proportionally balanced reason in comparison with Marianne’s sometimes 
obscures this fact.  
Elinor exposes both her sense and sensibility after learning of Edward’s 
engagement to Lucy Steele. Reeling from this news, Elinor experiences a variety 
of emotions, including “resentment” and “indignation” among others (SS 103). 
She begins to question everything she had once assumed about Edward. She 
muses, “Had Edward been intentionally deceiving her? Had he feigned a regard 
for her which he did not feel? Was his engagement to Lucy an engagement of the 
heart?” (SS 103). This display of doubt and feeling exhibits Elinor’s possession of 
sensibility. However, her ability to stop these feelings in their tracks and redirect 
them also illustrates the power of her personal sense. She says, “No; whatever it 
might once have been, she could not believe it such at present. His affection was 
all her own. She could not be deceived in that…What a softener of the heart was 
this persuasion!” (SS 103). Elinor’s acknowledgement of her feelings in this 
moment, then her quick reining in of those feelings before they get the best of her, 
illuminates both her reason and sensibility.  
Elinor’s possession of both sense and sensibility sets her apart as a 
representative female character, modeled after Wollstonecraft’s ideas in 
Vindication. After Elinor learns that Edward is no longer engaged to Lucy Steele 
but is free to marry her, she “could sit no longer. She almost ran out of the room, 
and as soon as the door was closed, burst into tears of joy, which at first she 
thought would never cease” (SS 273). In this episode the rational Elinor is gone 
for a moment and, overcome by emotion, she has to flee the room because she 
cannot control her sensibilities with her sense. Elinor possesses both sense and 
sensibility in this moment because, while her sensibilities are uncontrolled and 
run wild, she does have enough sense to leave the room and not betray what she 
feels to everyone present at the party. She finds that, “in spite of herself,” in spite 
of her best sense of reason, “she had always admitted a hope” that Edward would 
return (SS 270). 
When Elinor speaks with Willoughby, her emotions oftentimes get the 
best of her. When first speaking with him, Marianne is completely enthralled and 
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jumps into a conversation with him. Elinor, however, “was robbed of all presence 
of mind by such an address, and was unable to say a word” (SS 131). Elinor is so 
shocked and taken aback by his manner that she is unable to continue to carry a 
conversation, to compensate for her feelings with her sense, as she normally does. 
Indeed, when speaking to Willoughby again after his return, and after the havoc 
that he has wreaked on the life of her sister Marianne, “her voice, in spite of 
herself, betrayed her compassionate emotion” (SS 249). While speaking with 
Willoughby, “Elinor’s heart, which had undergone many changes in the course of 
this extraordinary conversation, was now softened again; —yet she felt it her duty 
to check such ideas in her companion as the last” (SS 246). Elinor exhibits both 
her sense and sensibility in these moments, in which she is overcome by emotions 
that she realizes should not rule her, but struggles to maintain personal autonomy 
by employing the use of her reason and keeping her emotions in check and under 
control. If she does become “prey to her senses,” she maintains an equal share of 
reason to offset its ill effect (VRW 130). Elinor also explicitly denies any 
accusation that she does not feel. After Marianne discovers that Elinor has kept 
information from her for months, she defends herself and identifies her own  
feelings. She says: 
 
You do not suppose that I have ever felt much. —For four months, 
Marianne, I have had all this hanging on my mind, without being at 
liberty to speak of it to a single creature; knowing that it would 
make you and my mother most unhappy…If you can think me 
capable of ever feeling—surely you may suppose that I have 
suffered now. (SS 198) 
 
Marianne, who previously criticizes her sister for not feeling at all, comes to 
realize through this confession that Elinor does indeed bear strong feelings. 
Unlike Marianne, though, Elinor is able to conceal or control them in the interests 
of protecting others.  
Through Elinor’s character and Marianne’s character transformation as 
she follows in the steps of her older sister, Austen, like Wollstonecraft, contends 
that sensibility is not completely unimportant. Elinor’s self-control in restraining 
her emotions is one indication of the importance of acquiring both characteristics 
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in equilibrium. For example, Elinor often conceals her feelings in order to 
promote the well being of others; these are not indications that she does not feel at 
all. When Edward leaves, she does not make an outward exhibition of her 
emotions, not seeking to “augment and fix her sorrow by seeking silence, 
solitude, and idleness,” as her sister Marianne “judiciously” decides to do (SS 78).  
Instead, she: 
 
busily employed herself the whole day, neither sought nor avoided 
the mention of his [Edward’s] name, appeared to interest herself 
almost as much as ever in the general concern of the family, and if, 
by this conduct, she did not lessen her own grief, it was at least 
prevented from unnecessary increase. (SS 79) 
 
 Elinor’s methods for coping with her sorrow demonstrate that one has to think 
rationally to be sensitive to the feelings of others (in this case, her mother and 
sisters). Elinor obviously suffers a great deal when Edward leaves Morton and she 
is still emotional in this moment, but uses reason to process those emotions in a 
way that gives her increased power over her personal being and enables her to be 
caring toward others. Elinor’s kindness to Mrs. Jennings is another example of her 
ability to use both reason and sensibility for the good of others. Although Mrs. 
Jennings is nosy and constantly inserting herself into affairs that do not concern 
her, she is kind to both Elinor and Marianne and Elinor seeks to return that 
kindness. When they are riding together, “Elinor took immediate possession of 
the post of civility which she had assigned herself, behaved with the greatest 
attention to Mrs. Jennings, talked with her, laughed with her, and listened to her 
whenever she could; and Mrs. Jennings on her side treated them both with all 
possible kindness” (SS 119). These moments in which Elinor puts aside her own 
feelings for those of others exemplify the connections between Austen and 
Wollstonecraft. Austen upholds Wollstonecraft’s affirmation that good will and 
love require thought, and thought in this case is mediated through a balance of 
reason and sensibility.  
While critics are quick to clearly delineate Elinor as the rational or 
“sensible” character and Marianne as the female protagonist plagued by her 
“sensibilities,” this dichotomy of the title should not be taken as a divisive 
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distinction, but rather indicative of “a kind of progression or education” 
(ApRoberts 355). This type of education is similar to the education that 
Wollstonecraft demands for women. Wollstonecraft’s focus on virtue, acquired 
through a balance of reason and sensibility, is not lost on Austen, in whose work 
virtue emerges as “a fount of decency,” rooted in, “the ability to feel, first for 
ourselves, and then, with good hope, for others” (ApRoberts 364). This self-
knowledge and empathy is essential to become a virtuous individual, wife, and 
mother. The sister faculties of sense and sensibility are mutually dependent in the 
Dashwood sisters who aim to become more virtuous, self-governing women.  
This close examination of both Wollstonecraft and Austen reveals a new 
view of Austen that is not often considered. While most critics “unequivocally 
align Austen’s work with conservative critiques of the culture of sensibility,” I 
argue that Austen’s Sense and Sensibility is a radical work that appeals to ideas 
first established by Wollstonecraft in 1792 (James-Cavan 16). The comparison 
between Wollstonecraft and Austen opens up a new view of Austen entirely, as an 
eighteenth century woman who is not solely focused on marriage and propriety 
but also on female education. Recent studies of Austen, which “concentrate on the 
co-ordinating conjunction, the ‘and,’ of the title,” prove that “the concepts have 
more to join them than to separate them” (James-Cavan 17). Nazar similarly 
argues, “Austen sounds remarkably like Wollstonecraft in her depiction, through 
Marianne Dashwood’s story, of the damage women inflict upon themselves by 
cultivating sensibility alone” (Nazar 127). Considering reason (or sense) and 
sensibility as complementary terms for reformed female education aimed at virtue 








Volume 3, Issue 1 | 2016 20 
NOTES 
[1] Critics agreeing with Butler include Tuite, Sedgwick, and Mudrick. 
[2] All subsequent references to Wollstonecraft will be noted with a parenthetical 
citation with the abbreviated title of her work (VRW) in place of her name.  
[3] All subsequent references to Austen will be noted with a parenthetical citation 
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